We investigate the relationship between the daily average interbank overnight borrowing rate (AOR) and the credit default swap price (CDS) of 60 banks using the Eurosystem's proprietary data from mid-2008 to mid-2013. We find that the AOR which is observable only by the competent Eurosystem authorities leads the CDS at least by one day. The lead was concentrated on days of market stress for banks which mainly borrow from "relationship" lender banks. Such borrower banks are typically smaller, have weak ratings, and likely reside in crisis countries. * E. Jokivuolle, E. Tölö and M. Virén are employed by the Bank of Finland. E. Tölö is a member in the group of authorized overseers (GAO) in the European System of Central Banks (ESCB). The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent those of Bank of Finland or the Eurosystem. We thank Ian Marsh, Jouko Vilmunen, and seminar and workshop participants at the Bank of Finland for valuable comments. All remaining errors are ours.
I. Introduction
In this paper we investigate whether micro-level data on banks' overnight money market borrowing are useful in probing and even predicting changes in banks' creditworthiness.
Any early-warning indicators or timely information on banks' concurrent state would be valuable for monetary authorities who have access to such data, especially during times of market stress.
We use the proprietary data from the Eurosystem's overnight money market which operates in the so called TARGET2 large value payment system (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System 2). The overnight market is the shortest term component of the interbank money market through which banks manage their liquidity. It is the key transmission channel for monetary policy in major central banks including the European Central Bank (ECB) and the US Federal Reserve. At the shortest maturity, the money market is an extremely liquid credit market with high frequency of observations. 1 This makes it an exceptional information source for studying the short term dynamics of counterparty risk. Investigating the potential of the Eurosystem data for gauging banks' stability has become increasingly important as the European Central Bank is starting its banking supervision function in 2014.
Our main research question is whether the average interest rate of the overnight loans taken by a bank, typically from a number of other banks, is informative in measuring banks' creditworthiness. Furfine (2001) has shown that the overnight borrowing rates do indeed reflect balance sheet measures of the bank's credit risk. However, previous research has not considered how efficiently and fast these markets price the credit risk.
1 Money market transaction data are available for longer maturities as well but we will focus on the overnight data because of the far bigger market size and liquidity. 4 average value of about 100 million EUR. These yield approximately 46,000 daily AOR observations with daily turnover of about 50,000 million EUR.
We use Granger causality tests of the lag-lead relationship between the AOR and the CDS, both for the panel of 60 banks as well as for individual bank time series, to test our main hypothesis. If the AOR were found to "Granger cause" the CDS, then we would conclude that the AOR is more informative of changes in banks creditworthiness than the CDS price.
To account for the general conditions in both markets, and possible non-stationary properties of the corresponding time-series, we first deduct the Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) from the AOR and the iTraxx-index from the CDS. In contrast to corporate bonds and CDSs with matched maturities in Blanco et al. (2005) , we find no compelling evidence of co-integration between the AOR and the CDS. However, the AOR and CDS are highly correlated (see Figures 1-2 ) while the daily cross-sectional correlation between the AOR and the CDS varies greatly (see Figure 3 ) suggesting that at least near co-integration might exist in certain subperiods, depending on the market conditions. In particular, during tranquil times, the overnight lenders to a bank may be less concerned about sudden changes in the borrower bank's creditworthiness. Because of the extremely short maturity (one day or even less) of the loan, other factors such as bank size, relationship with the lender, and general liquidity conditions may be important determinants of the AORs, making it difficult to disentangle the credit risk component. 5 Nevertheless, as overnight loans are typically quite large and uncollateralized, the AOR may become more informative of the borrower's credit risk in times of stress when lender banks become concerned of the asset quality and liability structure of the borrower 5 Nevertheless, Covitz and Downing (2007) provide evidence from commercial paper spreads of non-financial companies that in actuality, credit risk dominates liquidity risk even at very short maturities. 6 by, e.g., the bank's credit rating), the bank's home country being a crisis country, the bank being mainly a relationship borrower 8 , the size of the bank, or the liquidity of the bank's CDS. We find that the lead for AOR over the CDS is stronger for relatively weaker banks, for banks residing in crisis countries, for relatively relationship-intensive borrowers, for smaller banks, and for banks with a less liquid CDS market. The first two results are clearly consistent with the theory of Dang et al. (2012) : a bank's overnight loans' information sensitivity, measured by the size and significance of the AOR's (positive) lead coefficient, is higher for relatively weaker banks, and for banks residing in crisis countries. These banks are less likely to get support from their crisis stricken governments, may have domestic sovereign debt holdings which have deteriorated in value, and suffer from an overall decline in their asset quality resulting from their depressed domestic economies. Regarding banks who are relatively relationshipintensive borrowers, it can be argued that, first of all, relationships become relatively more important in times of market stress when the information-acquisition sensitivity of the overnight loans increases (cf. Dang et al., 2012) . Relationship lenders are likely to be best positioned to acquire further information in a stress situation while less informed lenders may reduce or stop their lending. This is what we find; the correlation between the iTraxx-index, measuring the level of market stress, and the average relationshipborrowing intensity of banks is 44% in our sample period 9 . Secondly, when the volumeweighted share of relationship lenders of a bank's all lenders is high, the bank's AOR should be more informative of the bank's health. This implies a stronger lead for such banks' AOR over their CDS. This is what we also find empirically. Finally both for smaller banks and banks with less liquid CDS, which also have a large overlap, the AOR 7 exhibits a stronger lead. This suggests that for smaller banks the overnight lenders' private information is relatively better. If CDS market itself is less well functional (as proxied by the bid-ask spread) the lead of the private money market signals may naturally increase.
With a similar dummy variable approach, we categorize the business days corresponding to various crisis periods or alternatively according to the stress of the financial markets, proxied by iTraxx CDS index. We find that during the sovereign debt crisis and generally during times of relatively high market stress, the lead of AOR over CDS is stronger.
Finally, conditioning the lead relationship on the interactions between the different classifications of banks, we find that the lead for the AOR over the CDS is strongest and most robust on days of market stress for banks which are relatively relationship-intensive borrowers. Such banks are typically smaller, have weak ratings, and likely reside in crisis countries.
On balance, our results suggest that by aggregating the private overnight interbank-loan interest rate data, the Eurosystem authorities may be able to extract additional information concerning banks' current condition over and above the leading public market signals; banks' CDS prices. Consistent with the theory of Dang et al. (2012) , the information sensitivity of the overnight loan rates relative to the CDS prices increases during market stress, and is accompanied with a relatively stronger presence of informed lenders in the over night market. Our results may also be among the first to provide support to a hypothesis that an aggregate of private signals concerning an asset's value may be more informative than the price of the same asset, formed in a simultaneous public market. This could be the case if some of the better informed agents do not want to reveal all their information so that it would simultaneously be reflected in the asset's public price. To facilitate a comparison with the CDS price, which is a spread in itself, the average overnight rates need to be turned into average overnight rate spreads using suitable loan rate index. We find Euro OverNight Index Average (EONIA) the most natural candidate since using it helps to account for general conditions in the euro money markets (e.g. the effects of policy rate changes, liquidity operations, seasonal effects due to maintenance periods). Since the EONIA itself is not a risk-free rate 16 , the CDS prices need to be transformed correspondingly (see next few subsections). Henceforth, we call the spread between AOR and EONIA simply AOR.
.
Here B refers to a borrower bank, L i,t is a lender bank for the ith loan in day t and is the rate of the corresponding loan while there are total N B,t loans to bank B on day t.
ISee also Figure 4 for illustration of the calculation of the AOR. 
Credit-Default-Swap (CDS) spread with respect to iTraxx
Banks' CDS price data are obtained from Bloomberg. We use the last price field, which corresponds to the mid-price at the end of trading. Because of time zone differences the end of trading time may vary across the banks. Typically the trades take place is in London and thus the price is quoted an hour or so later than the time at which the TARGET2 Day Trade Phase ends (most of the overnight loans also take place well before closing). The CDS quote is hence somewhat later than the average money market transaction, which gives the CDS a small informational advantage 17 . We only consider the CDS of the most liquid maturity, the 5 years. To facilitate a comparison with the AOR marginal, we need to deduct the general market risk present also in EONIA from the CDS. This is achieved by deducting the iTraxx Europe Financials CDS index 13 (varying composition) from the bank CDS. For brevity, in Part III we call this spread between the bank CDS and the iTraxx CDS index merely CDS. An exception is the Sovereign CDS used as a control in Section III.C, which is employed as such.
Markit iTraxx Europe Senior Financial subindex
The iTraxx Europe index also known as "The Main" is composed of the 125 most liquid CDS' of European entities. We use its sectoral subindex for financials, which consists of 25 equally weighted names most of which are direct participants in TARGET2. Similar to EONIA, the iTraxx index has a high correlation (0.93) with the mean CDS price in our 60 banks panel, and the results are robust against if the panel means are used instead of the indices.
Credit-Default-Swap (CDS) bid-ask spread
The CDS bid-ask spread is used to proxy the liquidity of the CDS. Because of the data availability issues we use two approaches for the bid-ask spreads. In the first approach we obtain the daily bid and ask CDS price data from Bloomberg for 57 of the 60 banks (for three of the banks the data was unavailable) and calculate the bid-ask spread for each day. The bid-ask spread has a strong correlation (0.84) with the CDS price itself. In a second approach, we obtain a snapshot of the real time bid-ask spread on a tranquil day in 2013, which is available to all 60 banks. Apart from small numerical differences the regression results are independent of, which CDS bid-ask spread dataset is used. We therefore prefer to use the snapshot bid-ask spread dataset, which allows to keep all 60 banks in the sample.
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Borrower Preference Index (BPI)
Following Cocco et al. (2009) we define the Borrower Preference Index (BPI) as the ratio of funds, F, that bank B has borrowed from bank L over a given time period Q t , denoted , as a fraction of the total amount of funds that B has borrowed in the market in that same period denoted (3) For each business day, we take the time period to be the last 62 business days including that day, t, which corresponds to one quarter.
To obtain a single number that quantifies the reliance on relationships of a given borrower on a given day, we further average over the different borrowings of that bank on that day:
As in Eq. (1), L i,t is a lender bank for the ith loan in day t while it is entirely possible to have several borrowings from the same lender bank. In the sum over loans it is natural to use the same weights as in the AOR i.e. in our case uniform weights. Note that both of the BPIs defined above attain a value between 0 and 1. Figure 5 shows the mean BPI and iTraxx CDS Index for 60 bank panel. The larger the value of , the stronger the relationship. Similarly larger indicates on average larger reliance on relationships.
Since averaging the BPI as above loses some amount of information and potentially lessens the relevance of BPI, it was checked that linear regressions between AOR on CDS and BPI yield similar enough coefficients irrespective of whether the bank relationships in BPI and AOR are taken explicitly into account or averaged over. The 15 finding was that for our panel, in both cases the BPI is informative and highly significant while the coefficient of is some 35 % smaller than the coefficient of .
Henceforth, we refer always to the when discussing of BPI.
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI)
As an alternative proxy for the market structure and relationships we develop and application of the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) to measure how concentrated the borrowing activities of a given bank are on a given day. HHI is the total of squared daily market shares of each lender bank in the market of "all lending to borrower bank B". If is the amount funds bank B borrowed from bank L on day t, and is the amount funds bank B borrowed in total on day t, the HHI is written as (5) Similar to BPI, the HHI index takes a value between 0 and 1. Generally when the HHI is larger, the market is more concentrated. 18 Figure 5 shows the mean HHI along with mean BPI and iTraxx CDS Index. During times of financial market stress (as proxied by the iTraxx index) the average BPI and HHI show also heightened values indicating more concentrated credit lines and more reliance on relationship lending.
Credit rating
As a 
Stock price
Stock price movements have been found to lead the CDS prices for investment grade entities while the CDS prices may lead in the high-yield credit market (see e.g. Fung et al. 2008 , Marsh and Wagner 2011 , Giannikos et al. 2013 , and are therefore a natural factor to control for. The prices are quoted at the end-of-day for the particular stock exchange. Later we will find that both the AOR and stock prices lead the CDS prices with the stock price movements having a somewhat stronger effect. Yet, in contrast to CDS and AOR the stock price levels are not a credit risk measure as such.
Balance sheet variables
We obtain a set of balance sheet variables from Bloomberg as additional controls: 1)
Total debt to total assets, 2) Total debt to common equity, 3) short-term (ST) debt to total liabilities, 4) long-term (LT) debt to total liabilities and 5) (logarithm of) total assets (or equivalently total liabilities). In 1 and 2 total debt includes ST borrowings, LT borrowing and securities sold with repo agreements and excludes total deposits and liabilities that do not bear explicit interest. ST debt includes the ST borrowings, securities sold with repo agreements and other ST liabilities (such as those that do not bear interest). LT debt goes similarly apart from the repos, which were already counted to ST liabilities. Total liabilities is ST and LT debt + total deposits.
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TARGET2 liquidity
As a response to the crisis, the ECB provided large amounts of liquidity to the banking system. ECB's Statistical Data Warehouse offers public data on daily liquidity conditions. We define the liquidity to be the amount of central bank money in the current account plus in the deposit facility.
Other control variables from the TARGET2 money market data
The TARGET2 money market data offers a multitude of potentially interesting controls.
First, we have the following bank-specific controls with daily frequency: (logarithm of) amount borrowed, (logarithm of) number of lenders, lending rate (spread to EONIA), and standard deviation of borrowing rates. Second, we have the following additional controls with daily frequency: (logarithm of) total overnight market volume, (logarithm of) total lender count, (logarithm of) total borrower count, standard deviation of all overnight market rates. As the credit risk is the leading cause of variation in overnight rates, the market wide standard deviation of overnight rates gives an idea on how the credit risk is distributed across the different banks. For the standard deviation variables we have also used percentile differences as alternative dispersion measures (and found the results unchanged).
Euro General Collateral Repo Market Rate (EUREPO)
EONIA is based on realized uncollateralized loans and contains credit risk. The risk premium in EONIA can be proxied by observing the spread to the less risky Euro Repo Market Rate (EUREPO), which is the rate at which at 11.00 am Brussels time, one bank offers funds in euro to another bank against European government guaranteed bonds and bills as collateral.
18 Figure 6 shows together the EUREPO-EONIA spread, the standard deviation of overnight rates in the money market and the iTraxx index. The high correlation between the three confirm that both the short-term and long-term credit risk has been relevant during the past years, and also that the risks have been unevenly distributed across banks.
III. Empirical analysis
A. Testing for co-integration between the AOR and the CDS From purely theoretical viewpoint it is difficult to see why interest rates or interest rate spreads would be non-stationary. However, in finite time-series samples such evidence is often found. Hence, we also start our empirical analysis by testing for the stationarity of and co-integration between the bank-specific time series of the AOR (spread) and the CDS (spread); cf. e.g. Blanco et al. (2005) . Obviously, the AOR and the CDS could be closely related if they reflect the same fundamentals concerning a bank's creditworthiness, unless the AOR is relatively information insensitive (cf. Dang et al. 2012 ) in normal times due to its very short maturity (overnight). Hence, it is possible that a co-integration relationship between the AOR and the CDS exists only during crisis periods when the AOR's information sensitivity increases.
The Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test, when performed separately for each bank, detects no unit roots for the AORs of the sample banks. In contrast, a unit root in the CDS is detected for around half of the banks. Unit root tests in the panel setting give consistent results. Despite the failure of the ADF test to detect unit roots for the AORs, the Johansen co-integration test finds one co-integrating vector between the AOR and the CDS for around one third of the sample banks. These test results appear to be rather 19 robust to lag order selection. In sum, because the evidence for non-stationarity and cointegration is not compelling, we use the standard Vector Autoregressive model in the subsequent analyses. To control the robustness of our results, we will estimate the leadlag model for the AOR and the CDS both in levels and differences.
B. The lead-lag relationship between the AOR and the CDS
The test for our main hypothesis that the AOR may lead the CDS is conducted in the standard VAR framework, using the Granger causality setup. We focus on a panel VAR but provide also bank-specific time series results. When controlling for various bank characteristics, we use interactions between the lead-lag relationship of the AOR over the CDS and various dummy variables to test whether the lead relationship is stronger for certain bank types and time periods, consistent with the information sensitivity hypothesis. Our empirical hypotheses are summarized in the following list. Hypothesis H2(v) that the lead for the AOR over the CDS is stronger for banks whose CDS is relatively illiquid is added to hypotheses H2(i)-(iv) which are directly motivated by the theory of Dang et al. (2012) . Hypothesis H2(v) could be justified by the findings of Blanco et al. (2005) who argue that the CDS leads the corresponding bond price partly due to better liquidity. By the same logic we could postulate that if the AOR were to lead the CDS, the lead should be stronger if the CDS market is relatively illiquid. 
Here vector and matrix are the panel regression coefficients shared by all banks and obtained by ordinary least squares (OLS). Elements of vector are the daily change in the AOR for bank , the daily change in the CDS for bank , and the control variables.
In order to fix the lag length of the VAR process we use the conventional information criteria. The Schwarz Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) has a minimum at 5 lags for the CDS. This corresponds to one week since only business days are included. In the case of the AOR, no clear minimum was found. In reporting our main results, we use one lag for both the AOR and the CDS, but consider also 5 lags to ensure robustness of results. Table 2 reports results for the basic panel VAR, both in levels (panel a) and differences (1) and (2) in panel c) of Table 2 regressions shows, however, that the results are not driven by outliers. Below we will work with and extend the difference form of the model in Table 2 because that lends itself more readily for interpreting the sign and size of the lead coefficient. Table 2 In Table 4 we report the basic VAR results (without control variables) for individual banks. 20 The purpose of these results is to show the large variation of the lead-lag relationship between the AOR and the CDS among individual banks. Only a relatively small subset of banks (7 out of 60) exhibits a statistically significant coefficient with 5 % significance level on the lead for the AOR over the CDS. However, each of the significant coefficients is positive, and more than two thirds of all coefficients are 22 positive. In the other direction, the lead for the CDS over the AOR, there is also a small subset of banks (6 out of 60) with statistically significant coefficients but with occurrences of both signs of the coefficients. These results further motivate our focus on the panel VAR results, with conditioning market and bank characteristics for the strength of the lead, to which we turn next. Table 5 extends the basic results of Table 2 by adding conditioning variables. The idea in Table 5 estimating equations is that we condition the lead for the AOR over the CDS (henceforth "the lead") on a number of dummy variables which proxy for the factors listed in hypotheses H2: i) -v) above plus some additional controls.
Concerning hypothesis H1, equations in Table 5 show that the coefficient of the (daily change in) AOR, lagged by one day, is positive in all except for two cases (regressions A(6) and D (1)), and the coefficient is statistically significant in about half of the regressions, depending on the specific conditioning dummy-variables included in the various equations. The conclusion from these results is that the lead is not a general phenomenon, or is at least quite weak, but may rather be specific to banks and times when, apparently, the information sensitivity of the AOR increases. We next turn to evidence on this. Table 5 provides evidence that the lead for AOR over the CDS depends on general market conditions and is stronger during crisis periods, especially during the sovereign debt crisis in Europe (see regression A (3)). The crisis effect on the lead is best captured by the dummy variable which indicates days when the iTraxx index has been above its sample time-series median (regression A(4)).
Consistent with hypothesis H2(i), Panel A of
The TARGET2 liquidity measure, appearing in equations A(5)-A(6), and reflecting the ECB's liquidity support measures during crisis periods, also indicates periods of 23 strengthened lead. Note that according to regression A(2) the lead is quite weak during the period after Lehman's bankruptcy but before the escalation of the sovereign debt crisis in 2010. This is consistent with that soon after Lehman the EU governments essentially guaranteed their banking sectors. However, the sovereign debt crisis questioned the solidity of these guarantees in many countries. Our results show that the information sensitivity of overnight loans changed accordingly from quite insensitive to sensitive: the effective size of the AOR's lead coefficient in regression A (2) is 0.015 while in regression A (3) it is 0.065, more than a quadruple, and statistically very significant.
In panel B of Table 5 , the lead is conditioned on alternative proxies of bank quality as
well as on the bank domicile, hence testing for hypotheses H2(ii)-(iii).
We use three alternative indicators to proxy for (relative) bank quality on a daily basis: 1) if a bank's daily CDS is above the same day's cross-sectional median CDS of all sample banks, 2) if a bank's daily AOR is above the same day's cross-sectional median AOR of all sample banks, and 3) if a bank's public credit rating (measured on the 21-notch numbered scale)
is below (numerically above) the daily cross-sectional median rating of all sample banks.
The first three of these quality proxies supports hypothesis H2(ii) that the lead is stronger for weaker banks, being consistent with the view that weaker quality increases bank debt's information sensitivity; see equations B(1)-B(3), respectively. Also bank domicile in a crisis country strengthens the lead (regression B(4)), which is consistent with hypothesis H2(iii). 21 However, when the alternative bank quality measures appear jointly (equations B(5) and B (6)), only the rating-based relative quality indicator remains statistically significant. 21 A crisis country is defined as being one of the so called GIIPS countries; Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal or Spain.
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Equations in panel C of Table 5 
test hypotheses H2(iv)-(v).
Regressions C(1) and C (2) indicate that the statistically significant lead is concentrated on days on which a bank borrows mainly from its relationship lenders, measured by the BPI index, and the borrowing is relatively concentrated, as measured by the HHI index. Regressions C (5)- (6) further confirm that the relationship indices (BPI and HHI) as a conditioning variable are also quite robust. Hypothesis H2(v) that the lead is stronger for banks with a less liquid CDS gets supported by regression C(4) but the result is not robust when all variables in panel C are included (regression C (5)). Bank size could also be a proxy for a bank's reliance on relationship lenders, but also for bank quality or the illiquidity of its CDS. Regression C(3) shows that smaller banks exhibit a stronger lead and that the effect is not entirely related to relationship lending as bank size as a conditioning variable maintains its significance against the BPI index (regression C (6)).
In panel D of Table 5 we consider together all variables in panels B and C and the most promising combinations of them. The only conditioning dummy-variables which are statistically significant when all these variables are present are the BPI and HHI indices (regression D(1)). The robustness is further confirmed in equations D (2)- (5) where the BPI index is controlled against other selected variables one by one. Similar robustness checks for the HHI index (not shown) yield much the same results.
In panel E of Table 5 we add double interaction terms such that we simultaneously condition the strength of the lead on periods of market stress, proxied for by the iTraxx index from panel A, and on each of the most promising conditioning variables detected in panels B and C. Equations E(2)-E(5) show that the effect of each of the conditioning variables which performed relatively well in the previous regressions gets further amplified on days of market stress. In fact, in each case the effective lead coefficient is essentially zero during "normal" times. Note that the lead coefficient conditioned on one
of the double interaction terms is almost identical throughout all equations E(2)-E(5).
This hints that the different conditioning variables together with the market stress indicator may proxy for the same fundamental factors. Equations E(1) and (6) show that when the different double interaction terms appear jointly, the two statistically significant conditioning double interaction terms are the BPI index together with the market stress indicator and the HHI index alone without the market stress indicator (the latter being somewhat less significant). Moreover, by comparing say regression A(4) with E(4) we see that conditioning on the BPI index indeed increases the lead coefficient and hence has an independent effect over and above the market stress. We may conclude on the basis of Table 5 that there is a robust lead for the AOR over the CDS for banks which are relatively reliant on relationship lenders and (to some extent) for banks with below median size, on days of market stress. An (unreported) auxiliary regression shows that a low bank rating and small bank size are related to a high value for the bank's BPI index.
These results are similar to those of Cocco et al. (2009) who find that "smaller banks and banks with more nonperforming loans tend to have limited access to international markets, and rely more on relationships". We also find that the BPI index is on average higher for banks in crisis countries. So, although it is understandable that reliance on relationship lenders together with market stress are the conditioning dummy-variables that best capture the relative informativeness of the bank's AOR (measured by the strength of the lead), there are more fundamental bank characteristics such as quality and size which in turn explain a bank's reliance on relationship lenders. As a robustness check, Table 6 reports largely similar results corresponding to those in Table 5 but using the conditioning variables as such in multiplicative interactive terms instead of first transforming them into dummy variables.
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Finally, we evaluate the economic significance of the lead coefficient for AOR over CDS. Consider an increase of 30 bps in the AOR, which is roughly the estimated longterm change in the AOR corresponding to a 1000 bps change in the CDS; see Figure 2 .
Based on the basic VAR model from panel b) of Table 2 , the estimated change in the next day's CDS would equal . This magnitude corresponds to the size of a bid-ask spread of a highly liquid bank CDS in our data. In any case, even for a quite extreme change in the CDS, the additional contribution from the AOR would be very small in absolute terms. The economic significance of the lead would of course be higher for some banks, as the individual bank coefficients suggest in Table 4 . Moreover, as results in Table 5 have shown, it would be stronger during market stress, especially for banks borrowing mainly from relationship lenders. Even stronger impact would follow if we used the level form specification (panel a of Table 2 ) and introduced a permanent change in the AOR. Due to the high persistence of the CDS rates the long-run impact would be even of the magnitude of 15 per cent.
To sum up, the economic significance of the predictive power of the AOR regarding the CDS probably remains modest in most circumstances. It is nevertheless useful to know on the basis of our results that the AOR's information content regarding a bank's health fares well compared to, and even better than, the CDS. To extrapolate this result, the AOR may provide quite reliable information during market stress also of banks without a CDS.
IV. Conclusions
In this paper we have investigated the informativeness of banks' average overnight interbank borrowing rates over and above their CDS price. We find that the daily changes of the average overnight rate spreads lead (in the sense of Granger causing) the respective CDS spreads for relatively weaker and smaller banks, for banks in crisis countries, for banks with a relatively illiquid CDS market, and for banks which are relatively reliant on relationship lenders. When these effects are allowed to control for one another, a robust lead exists for banks which are relatively reliant on relationship lenders and (to some extent) for banks with below median size, on days of market stress. These results are consistent with the general predictions from theories such as Dang et al. (2012) . Our results may be informative to the authorities responsible for banks' stability in providing an additional source of short-term information for assessing the risk of financial crises and current state of the banking system. Table 2 Basic lag-lead result for AOR and CDS 
